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A Report on Judicial Ethics 
By GRAY THORON 
ABSTRACT: While the ethics of the American judiciary cover 
a broad spectrum, both good and bad, the general over-all level 
of judicial ethical performance is relatively high. Most judges 
are honest and honorable. Where dissatisfaction is apparent, 
it is far more frequently directed at judicial competence than 
at judicial integrity and ethics. Corruption, dishonesty, sus- 
ceptibility to political pressure, and other ethical lapses are, 
however, not unknown, and on very rare occasions have been 
extremely bad. The ethical obligations of the judiciary extend 
far beyond the basic essentials of honesty, impartiality, and 
fairness. Judges must not only avoid evil or wrongdoing, but 
must also avoid any appearance or suspicion of impropriety, 
both on the bench and in private life. Selected ethical prob- 
lems are identified together with some of the areas where 
significant ethical lapses are to be found. While our judiciary 
has done well in meeting its ethical obligations, improvement 
is still needed. The best assurance for high ethical perform- 
ance comes from insistence upon outstanding integrity from 
those selected for judicial office. 
Gray Thoron, LL.B., Ithaca, New York, is Professor of Law at the Cornell School. 
In 1948, following several years of New York City law practice with Sullivan & Crom- 
well, he was appointed to the faculty of the University of Texas Law School. In 1954- 
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Justice, Washington, D.C. In 1956, he came to the Cornell Law School as Dean and 
Professor of Law, serving as Dean until 1963. He was one of three members of the La- 
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A DEMANDING critic will never be 
wholly satisfied with the ethical 
performance of any segment of any soci- 
ety. Our American judiciary, both state 
and federal, provides no exception. In 
the area of judicial ethics, we can find, as 
one would expect, a very broad spectrum 
of both good and bad. At one end of 
this spectrum, there are judges of un- 
usual competence, devotion, and integ- 
rity, who more than meet our highest 
aspirations for judicial performance. 
At the opposite end, there have been 
(though fortunately only rarely) some 
outrageously shocking and callous in- 
stances of judicial corruption or dishon- 
esty. In between, as most informed 
observers will agree, we will find for the 
vast majority of judges a relatively high 
over-all level of integrity and ethical 
standards, especially when compared 
with the situation in so many other 
areas of American life. 
Public satisfaction with judicial per- 
formance depends on judicial compe- 
tence as well as judicial honesty and 
ethics. Both are essential ingredients 
for an effective and respected judiciary. 
To the extent that complaints are di- 
rected at the judiciary, they are far 
more frequently aimed at the profes- 
sional competence and judgment of those 
who serve on our courts than at their 
ethics and honesty. Thus, the general 
reputation of our judges for honor and 
integrity appears to be substantially 
greater than their reputation for ability 
and learning. There have always been, 
and still are, a great many thoroughly 
honorable and honest men on the bench 
throughout the country. There are, 
however, far too few distinguished courts 
and outstanding judges. 
Although many suggestions have been 
advanced for improving the caliber of 
our judges, no ideal or wholly accepta- 
ble solution has yet been proposed. Ex- 
perience has shown that we get our best 
judges when those who are responsible 
for judicial nominations insist on candi- 
dates with strong professional and per- 
sonal qualifications. The point to be 
stressed here is that substantially less 
improvement is needed in the area of 
honesty and ethics than in the area of 
professional competence and qualifica- 
tions. 
HONESTY AND CORRUPTION 
The most basic question respecting 
the ethical performance of our judiciary 
naturally relates to honesty and integ- 
rity. How honest are our judges? Of 
all the ingredients of ethical perform- 
ance, this is the most fundamental. The 
general answer to this question must be, 
as already indicated, a strongly affirma- 
tive one. In court after court, trial as 
well as appellate, state as well as fed- 
eral, our judges have shown themselves 
to be on the whole thoroughly honest 
and honorable individuals, fully deserv- 
ing of the public confidence in which 
most courts and most judges are gen- 
erally held. 
This is not to say that individual ex- 
ceptions do not exist. Corruption and 
dishonesty, though rare, are not un- 
known. In a well-known article pub- 
lished in 1931, the late Jerome Frank, 
a respected and perceptive legal realist, 
who subsequently served with distinc- 
tion on the federal appellate bench, 
bluntly stated: "Crooked judges exist. 
'Fixed' decisions are realities."1 Un- 
fortunately, this observation is still true. 
One very recent example comes from 
Oklahoma, where three judges of the 
Supreme Court of that state were found 
to have been involved in a bribery situ- 
ation of the worst sort. This led to the 
impeachment and removal of one of the 
judges and to the resignation of another. 
The third escaped removal from office 
only because his term on the bench had 
1 Jerome Frank, "Are Judges Human?", 80 
University of Pennsylvania Law Review 17 
(November 1931), p. 34. 
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expired by the time his wrongdoing be- 
came known. Similar instances have on 
occasion been found elsewhere. 
In the same article, Frank also can- 
didly recognized that a few who hold 
judicial office are subject to some degree 
of political control, "decid[ing] . . . the 
way the boss tells [them] to decide."2 
This is a charge that is heard periodi- 
cally, especially in areas where rela- 
tively corrupt political machines have 
dominated the process of judicial selec- 
tion. In evaluating this charge, it is 
difficult to separate fact from fiction. 
I have personally discussed the problem 
with a number of experienced and in- 
formed lawyers and judges in whose 
integrity and judgment I have full con- 
fidence. I conclude that though the 
charge is often made without real justi- 
fication, there are occasions when it is 
almost certainly valid. There are 
judges, though again relatively few, 
who have so handled themselves as to 
raise reasonable suspicions that their im- 
partiality and integrity fail to measure 
up to the standards set by most of their 
judicial colleagues. Any judge who al- 
lows himself to be approached or influ- 
enced by a political boss or clubhouse 
leader with respect to a matter before 
him, or who unduly favors a party with 
special political connections, is a dis- 
grace to the bench. There appear to be 
few such morally deficient individuals 
currently in judicial office. There should 
be none. 
The observations in the preceding 
paragraph should not be understood as 
in any way questioning the honesty and 
integrity of the great majority of those 
who owe their judicial office to a domi- 
nant political leader. On the whole, 
judges so selected have not only shown 
complete independence once they have 
assumed judicial office, but also a thor- 
oughly acceptable over-all level of eth- 
ical performance. Complaints are fre- 
quently heard that those responsible for 
2 Ibid., p. 34. 
judicial nominations have tended to 
allow political considerations to out- 
weigh considerations of judicial fit- 
ness and professional merit. Such com- 
plaints, however, are usually directed at 
the level of professional competency of 
the politically selected candidate and 
substantially less often at his integrity 
or honesty. 
A basic ethical requirement closely 
related to honesty is fairness or impar- 
tiality. Judges must dispense even- 
handed justice. This does not, however, 
mean that every litigant can expect 
every honest and fair-minded judge to 
react the same way to any particular 
matter. Judges with certain back- 
grounds and experience are prone to 
have different approaches and sympa- 
thies in dealing with certain types of 
litigation. Such policy-orientation is a 
fact of life. Areas in which it has 
played a significant role include the 
personal-injury field, government regu- 
lation of business, civil liberties, matri- 
monial law, and the administration of 
criminal justice. 
Ordinarily, such differences in ap- 
proach or sympathy involve no ethical 
lapse or inadequacy. The issues which 
judges must resolve are often complex 
and novel. Closely balanced competing 
policy considerations, each fully sup- 
ported by a line of well-reasoned and 
persuasive precedents, may be available 
to justify a decision either way. Chief 
Justice John Marshall, in the early days 
of our federal judiciary, championed 
one judicial philosophy, and his succes- 
sor Chief Justice Roger Brooke Taney 
another. Similarly, different judges to- 
day can be expected to react in dif- 
ferent ways to matters of current legal 
controversy. All that we can ask of 
each judge is that he make his decision 
within the framework of our legal 
system, and as honestly, fairly, and con- 
scientiously as he can. It is possible, 
however, that particular views or preju- 
dices may be so strongly or passionately 
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held as to make the holder unfit for 
judicial office. Men of strong preju- 
dices do not normally make good judges. 
The problem with such individuals 
would usually be one of judicial fitness 
and temperament, rather than a matter 
of honesty and integrity. 
CANONS OF JUDICIAL ETHICS 
The ethical obligations of the judi- 
ciary obviously extend far beyond the 
basic essentials of honesty, impartiality, 
and fairness. It is not enough that 
judges avoid evil. They must also so 
regulate their conduct, both on and off 
the bench, as to avoid any appearance 
of evil or impropriety. Our courts 
would be rapidly brought into disrepute 
if either the legal profession or the 
general public should fail to have con- 
fidence in the integrity and impartiality 
of those who hold judicial office. Such 
confidence can only be earned and main- 
tained if the conduct and reputation of 
our judges are beyond reproach. Sus- 
picion of judicial impropriety can like- 
wise seriously undermine public con- 
fidence in our courts and judges. Thus, 
conduct which tends to give rise to such 
suspicions must also be avoided. 
High standards of professional moral- 
ity and ethics stem primarily from indi- 
vidual conscience, and not from legisla- 
tion. Nevertheless, most professions 
have found it desirable to formulate 
codes of acceptable professional con- 
duct. Such codes involve no reflection 
on the honesty and integrity of those 
they seek to guide. Rather they recog- 
nize a strong professional ethical obliga- 
tion to meet standards substantially in 
excess of mere avoidance of dishonesty 
or illegality. 
Two such codes of general application 
have been developed by the legal profes- 
sion. In 1908 the American Bar Asso- 
ciation approved its first Canons of Pro- 
fessional Ethics, following the lead of 
certain state bar associations which had 
promulgated such codes in the period 
between 1887 and 1906. In 1924, the 
American Bar Association approved its 
Canons of Judicial Ethics. The Com- 
mittee which drafted the Canons for the 
judiciary was composed of both judges 
and lawyers, with United States Chief 
Justice William Howard Taft as its 
chairman. As their preamble states, the 
spirit of these Canons should provide "a 
proper guide and reminder for judges," 
and indicate "what the people have 
a right to expect" from the judiciary. 
These Canons deal not only with the 
ethics of judicial performance on the 
bench, but also with what is expected of 
a judge as regards conduct in everyday 
private life. 
In evaluating the degree of adherence 
to the Canons of Judicial Ethics, it is 
helpful to refer at the outset to a 1952 
report, prepared by Judges Orie L. Phil- 
lips and Philbrick McCoy as part of an 
extensive survey of the legal profession 
conducted under the auspices of the 
American Bar Association. With re- 
spect to judicial conduct, this report 
began the summary of its conclusions 
as follows: 
The answers as a whole [to a compre- 
hensive questionnaire dealing with judicial 
selection and judicial conduct], and the 
general comments in particular, indicate 
the healthy condition of the Bench through- 
out the nation, when measured by the ad- 
herence of the judges to the Canons of 
Judicial Ethics which formed the basis for 
our inquiry. Judges are human, and it is 
perhaps to be expected that there should 
be some deviations in every State. While 
the Committee did not take a judicial 
census, the impression is strong that, in 
proportion to the total number of judges 
in all states, there are relatively few 
who fail to adhere to their oaths of office 
or to faithfully discharge their judicial 
obligations.3 
At the same time it was recognized that 
in certain areas, there appeared to be 
3 Orie L. Phillips and Philbrick McCoy, 
Conduct of Lawyers and Judges (Los Angeles: 
Parker & Company, 1952), p. 151. 
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"flagrant" disregard of the Canons "in 
too many particulars," especially as a 
result of "political pressures." Im- 
provement in judicial conduct was re- 
ferred to as an "imperative need" where 
such lapses existed.4 
JUDICIAL PERFORMANCE 
One important area in which ethical 
performance is not always all that it 
should be involves the matter of dignity, 
restraint, patience, and good manners. 
The Canons of Judicial Ethics wisely 
admonish each judge to be temperate, 
patient, considerate, and courteous and 
to make it his duty to see that court 
proceedings are conducted with fitting 
dignity and decorum. Nevertheless, 
some otherwise fine and competent 
judges have been notorious for their 
lack of patience, sarcasm, intemperate 
outbursts, or harassment of counsel. 
Such conduct may well be a normal 
human response to the pressures of a 
difficult trial or an overcrowded calen- 
dar, or to some apparent or actual im- 
propriety or inadequacy on the part 
of counsel. No matter how strong the 
provocation, judicial behavior of this 
kind is always regrettable. Bad man- 
ners, sarcasm, lack of civility or re- 
straint, and intemperance of utterance 
have no place on the bench under any 
circumstances. Such conduct tends to 
interfere with the fairness of the pro- 
ceeding in which it occurs, and in a 
number of instances has been a cause 
for reversal on appeal. It also reflects 
adversely on the judicial temperament 
of the judge in question, and will 
tend to undermine confidence in his 
impartiality and fairness. 
Bad manners and lack of patience on 
the part of the judge are but one aspect 
of the broader problem of maintaining 
courtroom dignity and decorum. The 
way in which the judge handles himself 
necessarily has a vital impact on the 
4 Ibid., p. 151. 
atmosphere and tone of any trial over 
which he presides. If the judge lacks 
dignity, so will the trial. The judge 
who permits a circus atmosphere in 
cases before him, or who reaches for 
personal publicity, is properly subject 
to strong condemnation. Wherever 
there is a loss of dignity, there is less 
public respect for the fairness and in- 
tegrity of the judicial process. The 
Ruby trial in Dallas provides an un- 
fortunate recent illustration of a case 
where the judicial handling of the trial 
appears to have fallen somewhat short 
of the standards called for by the spirit 
of the Canons. 
A related matter, which is a subject 
of great current controversy, involves 
the propriety of televising trials. Canon 
35 condemns this practice as involving 
improper publicity, destructive of the 
essential dignity and fairness of the trial 
process. The United States Supreme 
Court, by a five-to-four vote, in the 
recent Billie Sol Estes case held that 
the televising of the Estes trial operated 
to deprive Estes of his constitutional 
right to a fair trial,5 thereby giving 
added support to the policy of Canon 35 
in protecting the dignity and fairness 
of the judicial process. 
The Canons also properly stress the 
importance of judicial industry, prompt- 
ness, attentiveness, and diligence. In- 
stances come to mind of judges with 
poor and undisciplined work habits. 
There are judges who are notoriously 
and needlessly slow in deciding some of 
the matters which come before them. 
There are also observable differences in 
the degree of diligence shown by differ- 
ent judges. Habitual lack of punctual- 
ity is likewise specifically condemned 
by the Canons. With some exceptions, 
5Estes v. Texas, 381 U.S. 532 (1965). The 
Judicial Canons of the Texas Bar differ in 
various respects from those of the American 
Bar Association. Under the Texas Canons, the 
matter of televising and photographing trials 
is left to the sound discretion of the trial 
judge. 
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the bench appears to meet well its ob- 
ligations in these respects. This is not 
to say that judicial minds may not on 
occasion wander when some verbose or 
inept lawyer makes a confused or other- 
wise inadequate or dull presentation. I 
am personally acquainted with a sub- 
stantial number of judges in many dif- 
ferent states. A very substantial major- 
ity of those I know, or whose work I 
have had the opportunity to observe, 
are conscientious, hard-working, and 
thoroughly dedicated to meeting their 
judicial obligations to the best of their 
ability. 
JUDICIAL DISQUALIFICATION 
The problem of judicial disqualifica- 
tion arises periodically and has obvious 
ethical implications. There are certain 
instances where all agree that it would 
be totally inappropriate for a judge to 
hear some particular matter. No judge 
should act on a controversy in which he 
has a direct financial interest or in 
which a near relative is a party. 
Canons 13 and 29 so provide, as do 
many statutes. Other instances, how- 
ever, are not so clear. It appears to be 
generally customary for a judge to dis- 
qualify himself if he owns stock in a 
corporation which is a party to a case 
before him. If his stockholding is very 
small and in a very large corporation 
with thousands of stockholders, his 
financial interest in the outcome of the 
case may be so small as not to require 
disqualification, particularly where it 
would be difficult or impossible to find 
a substitute judge. Harder problems 
arise in cases where a relative, or former 
partner or firm, or a close friend whose 
hospitality the judge has frequently en- 
joyed, appears as a party or counsel in 
litigation before the court on which the 
judge sits. Former clients who appear 
as parties present a similar problem. 
There is no easy answer to many of 
the borderline problems in this area. 
The solution in each case is customarily 
left to the individual judge's sense of 
propriety, with the solution differing 
somewhat from judge to judge. Some- 
times a judge's decision not to dis- 
qualify himself gives rise to controversy, 
as in at least one well-publicized in- 
stance involving a highly respected 
member of the United States Supreme 
Court who decided not to disqualify 
himself when a former partner appeared 
in a case before that court.6 The prin- 
cipal criticism there came from one of 
the other judges on that court. The 
answer should depend on a balancing of 
the following factors: the judge's assess- 
ment of his own ability to retain his 
objectivity and impartiality, custom, the 
apparent degree of public belief that the 
judge's decision would not be affected 
by the specific relationship, and the 
availability of a substitute judge. Where 
no substitute judge is conveniently 
available, the rule of necessity may 
properly lead the judge to decide against 
disqualification. 
References have previously been made 
to the political pressures to which the 
judiciary may find itself subject. Prob- 
ably more frequent than attempts to 
control specific decisions are dictation or 
quasi-dictation with respect to patron- 
age matters. Judges have occasion to 
appoint trustees, receivers, masters, ref- 
erees, special guardians, and the like to 
aid in the administration of justice. In 
some areas these patronage appoint- 
ments have tended to be used politi- 
cally, and have not always gone to those 
best qualified by reason of ability or 
character. There have likewise been 
instances of excessive judicial liberality 
in awarding fees and allowances to such 
appointees. Such practices are strongly 
6 See John P. Frank, "Disqualification of 
Judges," 56 Yale Law Journal 605 (April 
1947). Professor Frank's article contains a 
very helpful analysis of the problems of 
judicial disqualification and detailed informa- 
tion as to the disqualification practices of 
judges throughout the country. 
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condemned by Canon 12, but, neverthe- 
less, still occur. Another practice in- 
volving substantial abuse has been the 
appointment of unqualified law clerks 
by some judges in response to political 
pressures, a practice which neither im- 
proves the efficiency of judicial perform- 
ance, nor creates confidence in the 
integrity of the judicial process. 
A very difficult ethical problem has 
recently been perceptively and candidly 
discussed by Justice Charles D. Breitel 
of the New York Judiciary.7 This is 
the problem of the judge who without 
the least improper motivation concludes 
that justice in a particular case can only 
be achieved by departing to some extent 
from the result which would be required 
if generally accepted legal principles 
were applied. As Judge Breitel puts it: 
"The judge knows that he is powerless 
to do in law what he wants and intends 
to do, for the sake of a justice he sub- 
jectively conceives and desires to 
achieve." Stated another way, is it "ever 
right to pursue the end even if the means 
are traditionally unavailable." 
In its crudest form judicial excess, es- 
pecially at the trial level, may be accom- 
plished by distorting the findings of facts, 
not too much, but enough so that the 
applicable rules of law will meet the needs 
of justice as the judge conceives them. 
Sometimes it will involve no more than 
avoiding a statement in an opinion of the 
real reasons for one's conclusions, thus 
leaving completely obscured the findings of 
fact or applicable rules of law on which 
the determination depends. This is sub- 
jectivism, no matter how sincere, at its 
worst.8 
The traditional answer to this problem 
is found in Canon 20, where the judge 
is admonished 
7 Charles D. Breitel, "Ethical Problems in 
the Performance of the Judicial Function," 
Conference on Judicial Ethics, University of 
Chicago Law School Conference Series, No. 
19, October 22, 1964 (Chicago: University of 
Chicago, 1965), pp. 69-73. 8 Ibid., pp. 69-70. 
that his duty is the application of general 
law to particular instances, that ours is a 
government of law and not of men, and 
that he violates his duty as a minister of 
justice under such a system if he seeks to 
do what he may personally consider sub- 
stantial justice in a particular case and 
disregards the general law as he knows it 
to be binding on him. 
Many strong judges are not wholly satis- 
fied by this traditional answer in indi- 
vidual cases where they believe that an 
obvious injustice would otherwise result. 
THE JUDGE'S PRIVATE LIFE 
The judge's ethical obligation is not 
limited to what he does on the bench. 
The Canons of Judicial Ethics properly 
recognize that the judge's personal be- 
havior in everyday life and in his non- 
judicial activities may be a matter of 
public concern. For example, there 
would be little respect for, or confidence 
in, a member of the judiciary who was a 
known alcoholic, or a corespondent in 
a divorce action, or a flouter of traffic 
laws, or who cultivated friendships with 
and accepted hospitality from suspected 
racketeers or women of doubtful morals. 
As Canon 4 states: 
A judge's official conduct should be free 
from impropriety and the appearance of 
impropriety; he should avoid infractions of 
law; and his personal behavior, not only 
upon the Bench and in the performance of 
judicial duties, but also in his everyday 
life, should be beyond reproach. 
Such obligations are broadly recognized 
by judges everywhere. While private 
scandal in judicial life is not unknown, 
it is certainly rare. Perhaps the most 
observable deviations arise from the in- 
judicious use of alcohol, but even such 
cases are not too frequent. 
No matter how active politically a 
judge may have been before his eleva- 
tion to the bench, he should thereafter 
totally dissociate himself from all parti- 
san activity. Canon 28 lays down clear 
42 
A REPORT ON JUDICIAL ETHICS 
guidelines. He must avoid making 
political speeches, making or soliciting 
contributions to party funds, endorsing 
candidates for public office, partici- 
pating in party conventions, or serving 
on any party committee or as a party 
leader. As this Canon states: 
While entitled to entertain his personal 
views of political questions, and while not 
required to surrender his rights or opinions 
as a citizen, it is inevitable that suspicion 
of being warped by political bias will at- 
tach to a judge who becomes the active 
promoter of the interests of one political 
party as against another. 
These standards have certainly been 
effective in some areas, but not every- 
where, in reducing significantly the de- 
gree of public participation by judges in 
partisan political activity. Their spirit, 
however, has not always been met as 
completely as it should be. In New 
York, for example, the Presiding Judge 
of the Court of Claims resigned his post 
several years ago to become Republican 
State Chairman. Now it is reported 
that he is under consideration for re- 
appointment to the court of which he 
was formerly a member. Such shuttling 
between judicial and political office is 
not to be encouraged. 
Another area in which abuses some- 
times occur is where the judge uses his 
office as a springboard from which to 
run for some elective nonjudicial office. 
In some states, this practice is more 
widespread than in others. Canon 30 
states that should a judge 
decide to become a candidate for any office 
not judicial, he should resign in order that 
it cannot be said that he is using the power 
or prestige of his judicial position to pro- 
mote his own candidacy or the success of 
his party. 
In most states, this Canon is pretty 
generally honored, but again not com- 
pletely. The most publicized example 
of a judge who flouted this Canon was 
the late Senator Joseph R. McCarthy, 
who ran for the United States Senate 
in 1946 while continuing to hold his 
position as a Wisconsin circuit judge. 
Judges also have special ethical obli- 
gations with respect to financial matters 
and business ventures. For example, 
Canon 26 admonishes judges not to 
make personal investments in enter- 
prises which are apt to be involved in 
litigation before their court and to 
liquidate any such investments which 
may have been made prior to the judge's 
elevation to the bench. This Canon also 
condemns the use of information coming 
to him in a judicial capacity for specu- 
lative purposes, and speculation in secu- 
rities by buying on margin. Part-time 
judges, who are not forbidden to prac- 
tice law, are alerted by Canon 31 to 
be scrupulously careful to avoid conduct 
in their practice by which they might 
appear to be utilizing their judicial po- 
sition to further their professional suc- 
cess. It would be totally inappropriate, 
for example, for such a judge to practice 
before other judges in a court of which 
he himself is a member. Judges must 
also make special efforts not to live 
beyond their means and to avoid, as far 
as possible, going into debt. As with 
most other aspects of judicial ethics, the 
judiciary generally appears to honor 
these obligations. 
In this survey, it has not been pos- 
sible to do more than to identify briefly 
some of the more important ethical 
problems which face the judiciary and 
to try to indicate a few of the areas 
where significant ethical lapses are to 
be found. On the whole, the perform- 
ance of our judiciary in meeting its 
ethical obligations has been good. It 
can, however, be improved. In the final 
analysis, high ethical performance comes 
from insistence upon outstanding in- 
tegrity from those selected for judicial 
office. 
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